Framing the neoliberal canon: resisting the market myth via literary enquiry by Bruff, I & Orth, K
Bruff, I and Orth, K (2018)Framing the neoliberal canon: resisting the market
myth via literary enquiry. Globalizations, 16 (3). pp. 245-259. ISSN 1474-
7731
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/621428/
Version: Accepted Version
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2018.1502489
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
Bruff & Starnes – Framing the Neoliberal Canon 
1 
 
Framing the Neoliberal Canon: Resisting the Market Myth via 
Literary Enquiry 
 
Ian Bruff (University of Manchester, UK) & Kathryn Starnes 
(Manchester Metropolitan University, UK) 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is widespread recognition that neoliberal rhetoric about ‘free markets’ 
stands in considerable tension with ‘really existing’ neoliberalizing processes. 
However, the oft-utilized analytical distinction between ‘pure’ economic and 
political theory and ‘messy’ empirical developments takes for granted that 
neoliberalism, at its core, valorizes free markets. In contrast, the paper explores 
whether neoliberal intellectuals ever made such an argument. Using Friedrich 
Hayek and Milton Friedman as exemplars, our reading of canonical neoliberal 
texts focuses on author framing gestures, particular understandings of the term 
‘science’, techniques of characterization, and constructions of epistemological 
legitimacy. This enables us to avoid the trap of assuming that these texts are about 
free markets and instead enquires into their constitution as literary artefacts. As 
such, we argue that the remaking of states and households rather than the 
promotion of free markets is at the core of neoliberalism. Our analysis has 
significant implications. For example, it means that authoritarian neoliberalism 
is not a departure from but actually more in line with the ‘pure’ neoliberal canon 
than in the past. Therefore, neoliberalism ought to be critiqued not for its 
rhetorical promotion of free markets but instead for seeking to reorganize 
societies in coercive, non-democratic and unequal ways. This also enables us to 
acknowledge that households are central to resistance to neoliberalism as well as 
to the neoliberal worldview itself. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite widespread recognition that neoliberalism’s rhetorical valorization of the ‘free market’ 
stands in considerable tension with ‘really existing’ neoliberalization processes, underlying 
respect for such claims persists. This is a consequence of the common focus on the 
contradictions between ‘pure’ neoliberal ideology and ‘messy’ empirical developments, 
whereby the role for the state and associated institutions is larger than anticipated in neoliberal 
ideology, leading to much attention being placed on studies of ‘really existing neoliberalism’ 
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002; see also Harvey, 2005; Cahill, 2014). Therefore, while 
disagreements over whether neoliberalism is (for example) a set of ideas, a political programme, 
an ideological worldview or simply the discursive justification for the current phase of 
capitalism are important, the intellectual foundations of neoliberalism tend to be neglected. This 
is all the more significant when one considers the fact that the ‘public intellectual’ role played 
by key neoliberal thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman is often the focus of 
the analysis (for example, Hayek, 1944; Friedman, 1962). The literature overlooks the essential 
foundations for these political interventions, reflecting the de facto acceptance of ‘in principle’ 
claims about the ‘free market’.  
This paper contends that we need to re-examine the canonical texts of neoliberal thought in 
order to arrive at a more satisfactory understanding of neoliberalism, in theory and in practice. 
It is not enough, though, simply to re-read these publications. Instead, we demonstrate the 
benefits of re-examining the canon of neoliberal thought as literary artefacts rather than simply 
political or economic arguments. This reveals that free markets serve as a literary device that is 
at once a product of the text’s constitution and what the text claims to objectively examine.1 
This device allows the authors to maintain a claim to represent ‘really existing’ free markets in 
their writings while constituting free markets in an image that serves the aims of their narrative. 
The constitution of free markets as novel, even marvellous, depoliticizes the neoliberal project 
Bruff & Starnes – Framing the Neoliberal Canon 
3 
 
by making the project appear as objective representation of ‘free market’ reality rather than 
‘free markets’ being instead understood as the product of constitutive authorial practices. There 
are further analytical implications, too. Most notably, our literary-theoretical approach reveals 
that neoliberalism has never been about free markets: the heavy intellectual burden borne in 
canonical neoliberal texts is actually the remaking of states and households in the name of the 
‘free market’ image (for a similar approach, regarding Economics as a discipline, see Watson, 
2017). Free markets are valorized as the ideal organizing principle for any capitalist society, 
but that is as far as it goes. 
This means that scholarly, political and policy debates need substantial modification as a 
result. Many have argued that neoliberalism’s economic and political dominance since the 
1980s has been challenged in the last decade: witness the failure of pro-market policy paradigms 
regarding financial regulation, the bail-outs of financial institutions by national governments, 
and the state interventions to prop up economies for years afterwards (for example, deficit 
spending from 2008-10 and Quantitative Easing programmes thereafter). More recently, there 
has been the rise to prominence of a range of political leaders and parties (for example, Donald 
Trump, Left and Right populism in Europe) openly hostile to what are viewed as axioms of 
neoliberalism, such as free trade globally and free markets domestically. In contrast, we 
understand the current period of authoritarian neoliberalism as actually closer to the neoliberal 
vision than in the past. The notion that the last decade has witnessed developments that are 
contrary to neoliberal principles can make sense only if one understands neoliberalism to be 
about free markets, which we reject (see also Bruff, 2014, 2016a; Tansel, 2017). It is thus 
necessary to critique neoliberalism not for its rhetorical promotion of free markets but instead 
for seeking to orchestrate societies in coercive, non-democratic and unequal ways (see also 
Beck & Germann and Wigger in this special issue).  
Crucially, such societal orchestration has states and households, together, at its heart. Below, 
we utilize the insights of feminist political economy scholarship to argue that the remaking of 
households in a manner which denies social justice is as important to neoliberalism as is the 
remaking of states in an anti-democratic manner.2 The centrality of households to capitalism is 
of course a long-standing concern of feminist scholarship (Dalla Costa and James, 1975; Mies, 
1986; Benería & Feldman, 1992), yet dominant modes of feminist analysis of neoliberalism – 
while still important – tend to detach ‘households’, ‘states’ and ‘markets’ into discrete 
categories (Bakker & Gill, 2003; Walby, 2009; Fraser, 2013). This article advocates a more 
integral approach, as outlined by authors such as Peterson (2010), Federici (2012), Roberts 
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(2013), and Soederberg (2018). To be clear, these scholars focus on neoliberalism in practice, 
but their work informs this article’s literary-theoretical analysis of neoliberal thought. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section offers a brief and critical review of the 
existing literatures on neoliberalism; subsequently, we outline our literary-theoretical approach, 
which discusses the roles of authorship, framing gestures, and foundational assumptions. Next, 
using canonical contributions by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman as exemplars of 
neoliberal thought more broadly, our reading shows how both authors utilize techniques of 
characterization and constructions of epistemological legitimacy to make their case for a 
science of economics. We then argue that this matters because of how it masks their strong 
reliance on the remaking of states and households in highly specific ways.3 The paper concludes 
with some comments on the ‘in principle’ and ‘real world’ implications of our analysis. 
 
 
Taking for Granted Neoliberalism’s Utopian Vision 
 
The dominant approach within the literatures is that neoliberalism’s genesis in the mid-
twentieth century – in an era characterized by the growing role in capitalism for ‘non-market’ 
domains such as the state, trade unions, and welfare programmes – meant that from the 
beginning its worldview covered all areas of social life. Inextricably bound up with this 
worldview, however, was the recognition that such domains could not be eliminated or 
drastically reduced in scope and power overnight. Therefore, a common denominator across 
various literatures on neoliberalism is that, from its originary moments onwards, it has been a 
profoundly contradictory project of social transformation. On the one hand, there is a ‘utopian 
vision of a free society and free economy’ (Peck, 2010, p. 7); on the other hand, this vision 
transmutes ‘into various arguments for the existence of a strong state as both producer and 
guarantor of a stable market society’ (Mirowski, 2013, p. 54). Examples of the latter include 
vigilance against ‘distortions’ of the market by groups such as trade unions, and the 
maintenance of ‘law and order’ in times of economic crisis and/or protests against a smaller 
economic and social role for the state.  
 Consequently, discussions of neoliberalism have focused on ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’ (cf. Brenner & Theodore, 2002), and for two main reasons. One, the scope for 
‘market-oriented’ political rule to exist in a variety of forms has turned out to be very 
significant, meaning that the possibilities for empirical studies of uneven, messy processes of 
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neoliberalization have proved almost endless. Two, by enhancing our understanding of 
neoliberalism in empirically rich ways, the literatures also provide the basis for a critique of 
neoliberalism’s utopian vision, especially its fundamental unrealizability. Consequently, 
debates and controversies have revolved around what are the putative essences of 
neoliberalization, which in turn inform how neoliberalism should be critiqued: a class project 
(Harvey, 2005), a drive to subordinate society to the market (Mirowski, 2013), an ongoing 
process of market-oriented regulatory restructuring (Peck, 2010), an anti-democratic political 
rationality (Brown, 2015), a discourse latent with transformative violence (Springer, 2016).  
 Clearly, our understanding of neoliberalism is more sophisticated than in the past – for 
example, in suggesting ways of overcoming unhelpful dichotomies such as state/market, which 
imply or actually propose essences that are intrinsic to various societal domains (cf. Bruff, 
2011). However, the closest one gets to enquiring into, rather than taking for granted, 
neoliberalism’s rhetorically ‘pure’ claims about free markets is to argue that the effects of 
seeking to realize the utopian vision is to empower the state in new ways, promote de-
democratization and economization, and so on. Hence, the possibility that neoliberal thought 
pays as much attention to ‘non-market’ domains as neoliberalism in practice has not been 
adequately explored (cf. Bruff, 2016b).  
Furthermore, and importantly, there is often the absence in the literatures of ‘non-market’ 
domains that are not ‘public’ societal sites such as the state, which has implications for the study 
of neoliberal thought and practice.4 Some contributions have been helpful for showing that the 
so-called ‘return of the state’ after 2008 and the emergence of various forms of ostensibly anti-
neoliberal populism do little to reverse the neoliberal tide that has been incoming since the 
1970s, not least because the state never went away (Konings, 2012; Jessop, 2013; Davies, 
2014). However, ‘public’ societal sites are heavily prioritized, skewing analysis and critique 
towards questions of state power and political authority. As noted in the introduction, there is a 
long tradition of feminist political economy work on the centrality of households to capitalism, 
and there has been much recent research on neoliberalism as well (see also Harcourt, 2017). 
The integral approach advocated by this article not only has analytical benefits, i.e. for gaining 
a richer understanding of the texts discussed below and thus of neoliberalism in thought and in 
practice. It also, as we consider briefly in the conclusion, enables us to acknowledge that 
households are central to resistance to neoliberalism as well as to the neoliberal worldview itself 
(cf. Bruff & Wöhl, 2016).  
 The question, then, is how to enquire into the possibility that neoliberal thought pays just as 
much attention to ‘non-market’ domains, such as states and households, as neoliberalism in 
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practice. In our view, this necessitates the literary-theoretical approach discussed next, which 
enables us to explore carefully the practices of writing these texts and thus the means by which 
the texts are produced. 
 
 
Authoring Texts through Framing Gestures 
 
The approach we outline below facilitates a thorough interrogation of the forms taken by the 
argument, the narrative techniques deployed, and the modes of articulation present in and across 
neoliberal texts. In particular, we are interested in understanding the significance of 
foundational assumptions in texts viewed as canonical contributions to neoliberal thought: if 
‘some kind of assumptions (as to what we are thinking about) must be made before we can even 
begin to think’ (Thompson, 1995, p. 48, emphasis in original), then it is incumbent upon us to 
focus on the texts where such assumptions are most likely to be visible. It does not follow that 
they are explicated in clear and systematic ways, but it is essential that they are identified and 
analyzed – the qualities of texts deemed canonical become the qualities looked for in texts 
which are produced subsequently (Harries, 2001, p.45). 
 We propose to treat canonical neoliberal texts as literary endeavours: how they are written 
is as important to critical enquiry as their content. As Starnes (2016, p. 156) explains, subtle 
gestures within the text reiterate foundational assumptions as uncontroversial to the extent that 
they become ontological features, no longer available as grounds for debate or critique. 
Recognizing how this happens requires making seemingly familiar ways of writing unfamiliar, 
and looking as much at how authors write as at what they write – for example, how authors 
construct themselves as experts and position their texts within disciplinary literatures (see also 
Starnes, 2018). As a result, we view the authoring of texts as a creative and productive process. 
This does not mean that we subscribe to a traditional understanding, i.e. that authors are 
singular, unique and self-possessed creators of the texts published in their name, somehow 
working in isolation from the ‘socio-historical conditions within which a writer exists’ (Morton, 
2003, p. 30; cf. Gramsci, 1985). Instead, we find useful Walter Benjamin’s (1970 [1934]) 
exploration of how authors are implicated in the process of producing texts beyond those they 
themselves author, through what he refers to as ‘techniques of production.’ Benjamin advocates 
treating texts as literary artefacts, which requires examining not just content, but also literary 
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technique, or the processes that show how content and form are entwined in all modes of writing 
(pp. 87-88).  
 Hence, we emphasize the role and position of the ‘expert’ within the text under 
consideration. This shapes the production of knowledge and the conditions for critique of that 
knowledge – and thus production of future knowledge. It also enables us to examine how these 
techniques of literary production are enacted within a text: for example, where authors either 
implicitly or explicitly comment on the writing process within the text. Such framing gestures 
have a specific role in the constitution of the ‘rules’ of epistemological legitimacy, which shape 
the conditions of possibility for future contributions to the field and thus for critique of the 
‘expert’ who helped create or contribute to the field in the first place.  
 In order to illustrate the advantages of the approach outlined above, we examine ‘The Use 
of Knowledge in Society’ (Hayek, 1948a; originally published in 1945) and ‘The Methodology 
of Positive Economics’ (Friedman, 1953a). Both papers have, since their publication, been 
understood as seminal contributions – they have been cited thousands of times each, and also 
serve as the philosophical foundations for Hayek and Friedman’s broader intellectual and 
political agendas. As such, they are highly appropriate texts for the purposes of this article. In 
exploring the texts, we looked at how the framing gestures employed by Hayek and Friedman 
allow them to produce a specific image of the science of economics as an enterprise that takes 
the study of free markets as its raison d’etre. However, this apparently natural equation between 
science and markets is in fact a technique of authorship which obscures the simultaneous 
constitution of specific, submerged images of states and households in the same text. This 
‘forgetting’ may be unintentional, often blending into the assertive practices of academic 
writing in which authors make space for their text in the literature by referring to their role as 
an expert, or not acknowledging the fully contestable nature of the decisions they make. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that, by virtue of their treatment of the question of a putative science of 
economics as one resolved by the image of the market, Hayek and Friedman propose the market 
as naturally occurring while themselves participating in its constitution.  
 But how do they actually go about this task? As we explain in the next section, both authors 
follow a similar line of argument. Firstly, they proclaim a scepticism about the possibilities for 
a science of economics, a scepticism which derives from the scientific method itself. Secondly, 
they use this proclamation to state that their own contribution is modest, because it recognizes 
the fallibilities inherent to all knowledge claims. Thirdly, they make a proposal which 
comprises an alternative understanding of markets in capitalism compared to what they claim 
to be the dominant view. Fourthly and finally, they use their avowed scepticism and modesty 
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to defend their proposal against possible criticism on the grounds that such criticism is 
unscientific, thereby foreclosing critique in the process. Therefore, in a creative and authorially 
distinctive manner, Hayek and Friedman’s framing gestures delegitimize critiques of their 
position as unscientific and thus inadmissible arguments, leaving the way clear for a naturally 
occurring market to represent the ‘normal’ way to understand their contribution to science. 
While this argument may not seem unfamiliar, the literary-theoretical approach outlined above 
reveals what is masked by such gestures, helping form the basis of a more appropriate critique 
of neoliberalism.5 
 
 
Hayek and Friedman: Scepticism, Modesty, Proposal, Foreclosure 
 
Both texts under consideration focus on the possibilities of creating a science of economics. 
Hayek discusses the problems of scientific knowledge (for example, 1948a, pp. 79-81), whereas 
Friedman’s essay is ‘concerned primarily with certain methodological problems that arise in 
constructing the “distinct positive science”’ Keynes called for (1953a, p. 3). Nevertheless, while 
ostensibly about scientific methods, these texts also engage with ontological themes concerning 
the science of economics’ object of study and epistemological questions regarding the kinds of 
knowledge production which are deemed admissible by both authors. 
 This reading of Hayek in particular may prove unusual, because it demonstrates his 
preoccupation with direct observation and thus empiricism – famously, he disagreed with Karl 
Popper on the supposed unity of the scientific method and thus the possibilities for universal 
knowledge claims. Hayek begins by stating that ‘knowledge of the circumstances of which we 
must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits 
of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals 
possess’ (1948a, p. 77). This lies at the heart of his science of economics: while accounting for 
differences between the natural and social sciences, Hayek nevertheless frames these 
dissimilarities not as the limits of the scientific method but instead as an ontological premise 
regarding who in society is most likely to have appropriate forms of knowledge of societal 
circumstances. Hence, his scepticism about the possibility of creating a science of economics 
focuses on questioning the scientific status of supposed experts, primarily because even their 
knowledge of the world is particular rather than universal (p. 80).  
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 This means that Hayek’s critique does not reject a science of economics, but merely 
dismisses the possibility for generalizable conclusions to underpin decision-making; he is not 
as different from Popper as is usually assumed. Consequently, he questions the possibility of 
anyone being expert enough to plan or manage economies on epistemological grounds of 
modesty: we can produce knowledge about our circumstances only via our own direct 
observation of them. Hayek thus argues that planning can successfully be undertaken only by 
those able to observe directly the ‘relevant changes and the resources immediately available to 
meet them’ (p. 84). Ultimately it is the problem of representation which troubles Hayek, not 
science itself. He therefore advocates a kind of extreme empiricism in which decisions must 
only be based on that which is directly observable and undistorted by the knowledge held by 
others (for example, experts).  
 It is at this point that Hayek’s position becomes more problematic. By entering into the act 
of writing in order to proclaim his scepticism about the knowledge claims of others and to affect 
a commitment to epistemological modesty, Hayek implicitly frames himself as an expert. This 
leaves him apparently exempt from the problems inherent to representation of knowledge and 
thus allows him to act as the arbiter of what counts (relative importance of particular things 
with which the ‘man on the ground’ is concerned) and what does not (the wider conditions and 
context for this ‘economic calculus’). Therefore, when Hayek then proposes the price system 
in competitive markets as a solution to the impossibility of full and empirically verifiable 
knowledge in the hands of individual humans (pp. 85-86), he endorses the impersonal market 
as a mechanism for the aggregation of particular knowledges born out of individuals’ direct 
observation of prices.  
 By making the proposal in this way, Hayek’s position as expert becomes clear: only through 
his understanding of science can it be possible to appreciate markets in the appropriate manner. 
For example, he describes the price mechanism as a ‘marvel’ on the basis of its accuracy in 
spite of being free from deliberate human design (p. 87). He then argues that the price 
mechanism has been stumbled upon, rather than constituted through human practices. Hayek 
thus treats it as an ontological fact, failing to acknowledge his own role in its reiteration and 
claiming he cannot possibly have the ‘expert’ knowledge to view it completely. This forgets, 
of course, the constitution of Hayek as just such an expert, qualified to choose those examples, 
plus his concomitant role in constituting the price mechanism’s status as ‘accurate’. 
Consequently, the proposal falls foul of Hayek’s self-proclaimed scepticism and modesty, 
because he engages explicitly in the kind of representation of knowledge that, earlier in the 
paper, he inveighed against forcefully.  
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 What is Hayek doing, then? We argue that he frames an ‘appropriate’ science of economics 
as possible only if that science understands markets as the singular legitimate source of human 
knowledge and activity – he forecloses critique of his own position as, by default, unscientific. 
By declaring that markets have spontaneously emerged over time free from human interference, 
Hayek posits them as ontological facts rather than as images constituted by his own literary 
techniques. Hence, the marvel of the market is depoliticized via Hayek discounting his own 
political decisions about what is relevant and what is not for a science of economics to be 
credible. For example, his claim that the price mechanism is indispensable for rational 
calculation in the face of economic complexity even goes so far as to explicitly deny the politics 
in its constitution and thus to dismiss critiques on political grounds (p. 89). Hayek then explains 
that the ‘remaining dissent [from other economists] seems clearly to be due to purely 
intellectual, and more particularly methodological differences’ (p. 89, added emphasis). The 
final passages in the article are devoted to debunking just one such critique (which is derisorily 
dismissed) and reinforces further Hayek’s extreme empiricism, which he attributes to ‘the 
unavoidable imperfection of man’s knowledge and the consequent need for a process [i.e. the 
market] by which knowledge is constantly communicated and acquired’ (p. 91).  
 To summarize, while Hayek can be (and indeed is often) read as critiquing the possibilities 
of constructing an ‘objective’ science of economics, he is in fact himself depoliticizing and 
stripping out the possibility of subjective bias within economics (knowingly or not). He does 
this by arguing that the only legitimate knowledge is not that which acknowledges the 
possibility of political expression, bias or questions of perspective in its representation, but that 
which is directly observed. In order to make this argument, Hayek rests on a partial and 
inherently political constitution of the market mechanism as ontological, neutral and, crucially, 
exempt from critique on ‘unscientific’ political grounds. Furthermore, by claiming only a 
methodological purpose for his text, Hayek obscures the epistemological and ontological claims 
his text establishes, immunizing them from (delegitimized) critique and framing future 
discussion of his argument around how markets function rather than the means by which he 
makes these claims about markets in the first place. 
 We have already noted that Hayek’s disagreements with Popper on the nature and status of 
scientific knowledge is significantly over-played. The same can be said about the differences 
between the ‘Austrian’ and ‘Chicago’ schools of neoliberal thought – Hayek being associated 
with the former, Friedman with the latter. While it is clear that distinctions can be drawn (cf. 
Kirzner, 1997) – for example, the potential for individuals to have full information about their 
circumstances – an examination of Friedman’s text reveals strong overlaps. For instance, 
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Friedman begins with a discussion of the distinctions between what he terms positive (his 
preferred version) and normative economics. Through this, he acknowledges that even ‘positive 
economics’ analysis has normative relevance and implications, which, along with the nature of 
economics as explicitly concerned with humans, poses a challenge to the development of a 
science independent of ethical positions or normative judgements (p. 4). Among the obstacles 
to the generation of empirical evidence that will allow the positive science of economics to 
advance is language, which is used to construct hypotheses, categorize materials, and shape our 
understanding (p. 7). Ultimately, Friedman’s scepticism revolves around the role that 
interpretation plays in the representational process of using language to shape and communicate 
any available empirical evidence. 
 This leads to the claim that ‘[s]elf-proclaimed “experts” speak with many voices and can 
hardly all be regarded as disinterested…“expert” opinion could hardly be accepted solely on 
faith even if the “experts” were nearly unanimous and clearly disinterested’ (p. 4). Hence, 
Friedman forefronts his modesty in such matters, for he acknowledges the role of judgement in 
assessing competing knowledge claims. Moreover, he uses this epistemological restraint as the 
basis for an appeal to direct observation as a means of making such judgements. Empirical 
evidence is cited as the criteria by which arguments are accepted or rejected and, starkly, is 
‘alone’ in being able to show whether analytical categories ‘have a meaningful empirical 
counterpart.’ (p. 7).  
 Hence, Friedman’s argument proceeds along similar lines to Hayek’s. Also with Hayek, it 
is at this stage that Friedman’s argument becomes more difficult to sustain without damage 
being done to the principles embodied in the text’s opening remarks. For example, he proposes 
that ‘the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with 
experience’ (pp. 8-9; original emphasis). While seemingly innocuous, this sets the stage for an 
extensive discussion of scientific procedure which delineates, in highly specific ways, 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of knowledge production. Friedman thus frames himself 
both as an expert in such matters and as someone who is somehow immune to the ethical and 
normative issues which he earlier argued were an inevitable part of all scientific research. This 
becomes more apparent when discussing the stages of constructing and testing hypotheses. 
Friedman acknowledges that the initial stage is always reliant on previous decisions, the context 
of old hypotheses, and is thus subject to the knowledge and interests of the investigator. 
Consequently, these ‘two methodologically distinct stages [of construction and testing] are 
always proceeding jointly’ (p. 14). He then claims, however, that the notion that starting 
assumptions are relevant to the validity of the hypothesis being tested is: 
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fundamentally wrong and productive of much mischief. Far from providing an easier means 
for sifting valid from invalid hypotheses, it only confuses the issue, promotes 
misunderstanding about the significance of empirical evidence for economic theory, 
produces a misdirection of much intellectual effort devoted to the development of positive 
economics, and impedes the attainment of consensus on tentative hypotheses in positive 
economics (p. 14). 
 
The implications emerge later in the text. Firstly, Friedman asserts that ‘[i]t is only a short step’ 
from the discussion of scientific procedure to the – in his view, widely accepted – hypothesis 
that firms seek rationally to maximize profits and have full knowledge of the information 
needed to make such an attempt (p. 21). Moreover, while he acknowledges that evidence 
supporting such a hypothesis is hard to document, its failure to be contradicted is by default the 
evidence for its scientific worth. On the surface, this is an example of Friedman’s commitment 
to scientific procedure, whereby a hypothesis remains accepted until it is proven to be false. 
Yet, later on, a more plausible reason appears. Here, via a series of assertions, dismissals and 
unsubstantiated claims, Friedman tackles attempts in existing scholarship to contradict this 
hypothesis. According to him, theories of imperfect or monopolistic competition – for which a 
wide range of empirical evidence is available, both then and now – possess ‘none of the 
attributes that would make [them] a truly useful general theory’ (p. 38). They are deficient, 
logically meaningless, offer no analytical tools, and therefore must be considered incompetent 
(pp. 38-9).  
 Why does Friedman treat alternative approaches and analyses with such contempt, especially 
when they appear to offer the possibility for precisely the kind of scientific dialogue that he 
calls for? For us, it is because he adopts a similar approach to Hayek. While Friedman’s 
invocation of markets is more concrete and applied – considering questions of company strategy 
and inter-firm competition (or lack of) – compared to Hayek’s more abstract claims about the 
price mechanism, the effect is remarkably alike. Hence, he also frames an ‘appropriate’ science 
of economics as possible only if that science understands markets as the singular legitimate 
source of human knowledge and activity – Friedman forecloses critique of his own position as, 
by default, unscientific. He does this via implicit ontological claims about the assumed rational 
actions of firms and thus, more broadly, about the markets the firms are part of; 
epistemologically, he asserts that any deviation from the process of hypothesis testing as 
outlined in the text renders that piece of research irrelevant. Hence his concluding argument 
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that normative judgements ‘impede objectivity’ and thus the formulation of scientifically 
informed analysis (p. 40), which can be understood as an attempt to delegitimize alternative 
worldviews (be they on the nature of firms and markets or on the principles governing research). 
It is clear that, contrary to the pretensions offered early in the text, Friedman understands 
himself as an expert, and an expert whose judgement is superior to those within economics who 
believe that normative questions are relevant in a range of ways.  
 To summarize, while Friedman can be (and indeed is often) read as defending an objective, 
value-free version of social science research, he in fact saturates his arguments about science 
with his own value-laden assertions (knowingly or not). He acknowledges the inevitability of 
normative influences and ethical implications of the analytical judgements that are made, but 
ignores his own self-interest when arguing that the influence of interests and the difficulty of 
accuracy in starting assumptions and representations is of no consequence for a science of 
economics to be ‘good’. In order to make this argument, Friedman ultimately rests on a partial 
and inherently political constitution of the market which he defends as ontological, neutral and 
exempt from ‘incompetent’ and unscientific critique. Furthermore, as with Hayek the text 
obscures these epistemological and ontological claims, immunizing them from (delegitimized) 
critique and framing future discussion of the argument around how to study markets 
scientifically rather than the means by which the scientific study of markets is valorized in the 
first place. 
 
 
Hayek and Friedman: Remaking States and Households in the Name of Free 
Markets 
 
As argued in the previous section, Hayek and Friedman use a range of author framing gestures 
in order to set the scene for the promotion of the free market as the ideal principle for organizing 
society. More specifically, they do so via a scepticism-modesty-proposal-foreclosure sequence 
which seeks simultaneously to entwine a science of economics with the valorization of free 
markets and to prevent critiques of their approach from untangling science from free markets. 
It is therefore unsurprising that (as noted above) critical engagements with neoliberalism have 
focused on how the abstract formalism of a science of free markets has yet to be realized in 
practice, with state empowerment, de-democratization and economization being the more likely 
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outcomes. Yet this leaves outside the scope of critical analysis the foundational assumptions 
which underpin the putative science of free markets. It is to these that we now turn. 
 Hayek and Friedman’s defence of a science of free markets leads them, in other works, to 
focus on how the ‘real economy’ should/could move closer to the abstract ideal of the market. 
This is often discussed in terms of distortions or obstacles which need eliminating – for 
example, trade union power and discretionary state intervention. On the surface, these are 
standard neoliberal claims about undesirable interference in potentially ‘pure’ market 
processes, meaning that the texts appear to be arguments for negation – that is, for the need to 
remove the artificial poison from the naturally occurring market. In contrast, we contend that a 
rather different case is being made: the texts argue for specific kinds of states and households 
per se rather than position them as obstacles on the road to market utopia. Hence, while 
neoliberal intellectuals valorize the free market as an abstract ideal, the crucial passages in their 
texts are those which discuss the sites in society – principally, states and households – which 
require remaking in the name of free markets. It is the apparent expulsion of states and 
households from markets which forces these texts into a strong dependence on states and 
households in order to make markets possible; without states and households, markets in 
capitalism have no foundation upon which they can be constructed and perpetuate. 
To illustrate, we start by considering essays published in the same volumes as the ‘science’ 
texts. Hayek’s ‘The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism’ (Hayek, 1948b) begins by 
stating that ‘the main purpose of interstate federation is to secure peace’ across borders (p. 255), 
between different individual nation-states as part of a larger political union. However, within a 
few pages he clarifies that the main means of achieving this is to create an economic union: 
otherwise, ‘conflicts of interests tend to become conflicts between the same [national] groups 
of people, instead of conflicts between groups of constantly varying composition’ (p. 257). As 
such, Hayek recommends a single, federation-wide monetary policy, the absence of tariffs 
within the union, and bans on state assistance for certain industries. The means of achieving 
these goals comes later in the text: the ‘federation will have to possess the negative power of 
preventing individual states from interfering with economic activity…there must be no 
substitution of day-to-day interference and regulation for the impersonal forces of the market’ 
(p. 267, p. 268; emphasis added). Hence, through the federation ‘providing a rational permanent 
framework’ (p. 268; emphasis added) which insulates national states from popular participation 
in political life, Hayek attacks the idea of democracy itself, arguing that democracy ‘will work 
only if we do not overload it’ (p. 271). In other words, economic union can be achieved only 
by the proactive, perpetual remaking of states in an anti-democratic manner.  
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In ‘The “Welfare” Effects of an Income Tax and an Excise Tax’ (Friedman, 1953b), 
Friedman critiques the ‘alleged’ superiority of income compared to excise taxes in terms of the 
welfare outcomes they generate (p. 100). He discusses the effects of income and excise taxes 
on indifference curves – which are used in mainstream economics to model consumption 
preferences for given individuals and communities – to argue that the latter in fact have superior 
welfare effects than the former. However, as with Hayek the implications come later: Friedman 
builds on his analysis to argue explicitly against progressive income taxation – used by 
governments to reduce levels of socio-economic inequality – because it is likely to ‘falsify [i.e. 
render inefficient] rates of substitution’ of one good for another by members of the community 
when altering their consumption preferences (p. 112). Hence, through the claim that debates on 
taxation should be about potential allocative efficiency rather than putative distributional 
outcomes (p. 107), Friedman contends that the only optimal form of taxation is that which looks 
like an excise tax – levied on all members of the community at the same level (pp. 112-113). A 
key implication is that individuals and thus households (which are taken to be the same thing) 
ought to be held responsible for the waxing and waning of general economic fortunes – for 
example, if they consume in a sub-optimal manner – and not societal factors such as axes of 
inequality (for more on this, see Bruff, 2018). When economic difficulties ensue, households 
thus need to bear the burden of adjustment towards an optimal use of resources, becoming more 
accurate in estimating future income and forming more appropriate consumption preferences. 
In other words, economic efficiency can be achieved only by the proactive, perpetual remaking 
of households in a manner which denies social justice.  
 Space prevents a more detailed discussion of these texts, but it is instructive to connect them 
to other canonical works authored by Hayek and Friedman, which can also be read and critiqued 
in the literary-theoretical manner outlined in this article. For instance, Hayek’s (1941) The Pure 
Theory of Capital argues in detail that markets are inherently dynamic, meaning that the future 
is unknown and no market participant has full knowledge of their situation as a result. 
Nevertheless, he still contends that a tendential state of equilibrium and order in the economy 
is possible, but only if the market can operate unhindered by non-market forces (for more on 
this, see Bruff, 2018). Towards the end of the book – which is ostensibly a critique of 
neoclassical forms of economics such as Friedman’s – Hayek makes clear that the main 
obstacles to markets operating in this fluid and dynamically ordered way are monopolies as 
operated by trade unions and especially the state. Strikingly, private monopolies (i.e. by a 
dominant firm) are conspicuous by their absence, presumably because Hayek would claim that 
market processes would erode them naturally over time; hence, states need to be self-
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constraining, non-monopolistic entities in order to facilitate the unhindered market. Moreover, 
in The Constitution of Liberty (1960) Hayek outlines an expanded conception of legitimate state 
coercion – which is legitimate insofar as it performs the anti-democratic duties discussed above 
– and discusses at length welfare states and progressive taxation, which are criticized heavily 
as illegitimate forms of coercion because they prevent individuals and households from being 
responsible for general economic outcomes. 
 Regarding Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957) outlined his famous 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH). The PIH argues that individuals plan over the whole life 
cycle their expected incomes and therefore consumption patterns – for instance, if they foresee 
career progression which leads to a gradually increasing salary. However, this argument coheres 
only via the assumption that savings and income levels are unrelated phenomena; that is, a poor 
individual’s savings decisions are as unconstrained by material circumstances as a rich 
individual’s. As such, Friedman assumes inequality is not a factor in savings and consumption 
patterns, for they are borne out of individual life cycle calculations. A key implication is the 
conclusion (p. 234) that rising permanent income expectations are more economically optimal 
if they result from individuals investing in their own future rather than the outcome of external 
stimulus (for example, state spending in response to a recession). In other words, Friedman 
attacks the notion of state borrowing, but endorses personal borrowing; households ought to be 
remade as indebted societal sites, with clear implications for the reproduction of various axes 
of inequality. Moreover, as with Hayek the remaking of states as self-constraining entities 
emerges as a key goal, in the name of free markets, so they do not provide the external stimulus 
which distorts and undermines individual life cycle calculations. This is also the underlying 
rationale for the mammoth A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963); indeed, it is striking that, for someone who is rhetorically hostile to the state, 
Friedman managed to co-author almost 1000 pages on how precisely the state should have acted 
in the sphere of monetary policy over the course of a century. 
 It is hopefully clear that the texts discussed in this article ought to be understood not just for 
what is written in them, but also for how they are written. This enables us to acknowledge how 
Hayek and Friedman utilize literary techniques of production in the attempt to constrain and 
limit the available grounds for critique of their position. Moreover, our analysis facilitates the 
decisive rejection of the notion that neoliberal texts are fundamentally about the valorization of 
free markets, because we can now recognize instead that they (re)produce highly specific 
images of states and households in service to the abstract principle of the free market. States 
Bruff & Starnes – Framing the Neoliberal Canon 
17 
 
and households need to be at the heart of analyses of neoliberalism, and thus of critiques of it – 
in theory and in practice.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Via a literary-theoretical approach to the reading of texts, this article has argued that neoliberal 
thought can be productively re-examined in order to bring something new to discussions of 
canonical texts in this tradition and also to debates and controversies about contemporary forms 
of neoliberalism. Utilizing Friedman and Hayek as exemplars, we have argued that their explicit 
project – the construction of a science of free markets – has served to mask an implicit yet more 
important agenda – the remaking of states and households. As such, we contend that it is time 
for critiques of neoliberalism to move beyond the ‘pure’ theory / ‘messy’ practices dichotomy, 
as productive as this has been over the last two decades. Instead, we ought to understand 
neoliberalism as the attempt to orchestrate societies in coercive, non-democratic and unequal 
ways. Furthermore, this attempt is not somehow an effect of projects to realize the vision of a 
free market utopia; it is the project itself. 
 It was noted earlier in the article that neoliberalism’s genesis in the mid-twentieth century – 
in an era characterized by the growing role in capitalism for ‘non-market’ domains such as the 
state, trade unions, and welfare programmes – meant that from the beginning there was a 
recognition that such domains could not be eliminated or drastically reduced in scope and power 
overnight. For this reason, it is essential that we understand the current period of authoritarian 
neoliberalism as actually closer to the neoliberal vision than in the past. States are reconfiguring 
into increasingly authoritarian entities or are expanding already-existing forms of authoritarian 
practices, households have become increasingly weighed down by indebtedness, the expulsion 
of the poor and vulnerable from social programmes supposed to help them has become 
gradually normalized, and the ‘solutions’ on offer to continued low or non-existent economic 
growth – which frequently invoke the fiction of the ‘free market’ – are strongly reminiscent of 
the processes (such as the securitization of financial instruments) which catalyzed the 
emergence of serious crises in the late 2000s.  
 The analytical implications of our argument are hopefully clear by now. Regarding the 
implications for resisting neoliberalism on the basis of the critique that we offer, it is hoped that 
this article speaks to the growing recognition that the state is imbricated in and not protective 
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against neoliberal practices. This might, in the longer-term, create more propitious conditions 
for the emergence of new, more equitable modes of living via a greater awareness of what needs 
to change (Bruff, 2016a). However, this is only possible if we engage in and also look beyond 
formal forms of politics and activism, towards households as being a potentially crucial site of 
politicization which ‘provide[s] leverage for radical social critique’ (Young, 2005, p. 146; see 
also Federici, 2012; Dowling, 2016). In other words, if the great power of the neoliberal project 
has been the attempted remaking of states and households in the name of the market, then what 
happens if we pursue an alternative endeavour, seeking to remake states and households in the 
name of equality, justice, dignity and solidarity? 
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Notes 
 
1 Synonymic terms such as ‘competitive markets’ or simply ‘the market’ perform the same function as 
‘free markets’ in neoliberal texts. As noted in the section ‘Remaking states and households’ in this 
article, neoliberal texts make their claims about ‘free markets’ in terms of negation – i.e. the need to 
eliminate undesirable interference in otherwise naturally occurring market processes. As such, the 
function performed by the literary device ‘free markets’ extends to similar terms invoked to make the 
same points about negating unnatural interferences. See also Bruff (2018).  
2 An ostensibly similar argument has been made by Melinda Cooper. However, there are two key 
differences between her and our position: (i) Cooper argues that during the 1960s and 1970s neoliberal 
intellectuals ‘refined and in some cases utterly revised their founding concepts’ in response to various 
social upheavals (2017, p. 18), which skips over the canonical works we consider of such importance 
for neoliberalism’s subsequent trajectory; (ii) while she is correct to point to the growing political 
alliance between (economic) neoliberalism and (social) neoconservatism from the 1970s onwards, the 
intellectual and philosophical basis for such an alliance had always been immanent to neoliberalism (as 
this article shows). 
3 For reasons of space, this article does not address the ordoliberal strand of neoliberal thought. 
Nevertheless, the argument found in this article implicitly addresses a key thread within literatures on 
neoliberalism, namely ordoliberalism’s possible incompatibilities with the Austrian and Chicago forms 
of neoliberalism due to its explicit recognition of the state’s role in the constitution and functioning of 
markets. It is hopefully clear that, rather than asking whether ordoliberalism can be considered neoliberal 
or not, we ought to acknowledge that all significant strands of neoliberal thought envision crucial roles 
for states and households in the constitution of markets in capitalism. Ordoliberals are simply more 
explicit about states in particular compared to scholars such as Hayek and Friedman. 
4 This includes the work of one of us, who has written extensively on neoliberalism. For instance, Bruff 
(2014) discusses ‘social’ institutions of governance such as collective bargaining in the workplace, 
political parties and welfare states, all of which could be understood as ‘public’ societal sites. While 
these institutions often have dense and multi-faceted connections with ‘private’ sites such as households 
– especially regarding workfarism – it is only more recently that an explicit discussion of households 
became visible in his work (Bruff and Wöhl, 2016). Nevertheless, the argument in the 2014 article 
‘nonmarket areas of social life took on a particularly important role in neoliberal ideology’ (p. 114) 
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facilitated the extension of the initial discussion to households. See also Koch (2018) on state coercion 
and localized forms of social struggle, especially around housing. 
5 The reader will start to notice the repetition of a few key phrases and points. This is deliberate, for it 
maximizes the potential of our focus on the articulation and organization of language in neoliberal texts. 
It also permits the use of repetition in our own articulation and organization of language, as a means of 
showing what the implications are of our interrogation of neoliberal texts.  
